Towards smarter nuclear export controls
It is time to review and improve the functioning of nuclear export controls by introducing a risk-based approach and by providing guidance that will help small companies especially understand and deliver on their obligations, writes Sandro Zero.
It is time to review and improve the functioning of nuclear export controls by introducing a risk-based approach and by providing guidance that will help small companies especially understand and deliver on their obligations.
A little over 10 years ago the United Nations Security Council resolved to enhance international cooperation in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and other types of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) through illicit trafficking along supply chains. That resolution (1540, adopted in 2004) called on governments to maintain appropriate and effective export controls and to work with industry to prevent illicit trafficking.
The resolution also acknowledged that preventing proliferation should not hamper international cooperation for peaceful purposes, but the complexity of the regulations makes it difficult for exporters to comply and distorts trade in nuclear components and materials and in the transfer of technology.
It is time to review and improve the functioning of nuclear export controls by introducing a risk-based approach and by providing guidance that will help small companies especially understand and deliver on their obligations. Today there are big differences in how countries apply export controls. Some are very efficient in issuing licenses; others impose too many administrative requirements; and others have weak enforcement processes. Those few governments that have tried to build up a capability in nuclear weaponry by covert means focus on small companies making strategic equipment where there is only weak enforcement by the authorities. So far, terrorists have not been successful in amassing sufficient know-how and technology to make a bomb or radiological release device – but they have tried.
Governments through the United Nations and the Nuclear Suppliers Group have reached out to industry to get us to support their efforts to combat proliferation and the misuse of nuclear, chemical, biological, missile and electronic technologies. With the World Nuclear Association and major exporting companies a meeting was convened last month in Brussels to launch the Botticelli Project. Our aim is forge a better dialogue and cooperation with governments and international institutions to prevent illicit trafficking and harmonize international rules and practices to reinforce competitiveness. The companies taking part in the initiative are Airbus Helicopters, Air Liquide, Boeing, Alstom, Areva, EDF Energy, Ericsson, GE, Hitachi, Merck, Philips, Rolls-Royce, Safran, Siemens, Thales and Westinghouse. We also include universities like King's College London, Liege and La Sapienza Rome since these are also subject to export regulations as they govern intangible transfers, and industry associations.
On the practical side we aim to prepare guidelines to help companies implement internal compliance programs, offer small and medium-sized enterprises support from a roster of experts and act as a voice for exporters with international institutions. Over the longer term, we also want to see the strategic export control regimes evolve, to recognize the international nature of supply chains, to adopt a risk-weighted licensing process, and to simplify the compliance requirements between countries that adhere to international security principles. For example, in terms of nuclear technology, the components for a nuclear reactor pose little proliferation risk until the plant is commissioned; and even after that in almost all countries the installation is subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Reprocessing and enrichment technologies create more concern, so licensing should involve thorough checks on the end-user and secure shipment arrangements. A simpler regime will help governments focus on transactions that genuinely cause concern and will help level the playing field for legitimate and well-run companies to compete in the global market.
Sandro Zero
Comments? Please send them to editor@world-nuclear-news.org
Sandro Zero, on behalf of the Botticelli Project.
